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Abstract
Federal, state, and local budget issues in the aftermath of the Great Recession
stimulated a revival of interest in government worker pay. In the paper, we study
the evolution of the federal-private pay differential from 1995 to 2017 using Current
Population Survey data, enabling us to examine the current pay gap and how it has
changed over time. Wage regressions are estimated by year for federal and private
sector workers and used to calculate the yearly federal-private wage differential. To
deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we adopt control function methods. We also esti-
mate of the probability of receiving employer-provided health insurance and a pension
plan each year for each sector. The findings imply that the federal pay differential
is invariably positive, fell during the 1990s, rose in the early 2000s until 2013, then
tended to decrease. There is evidence that the differential is related to federal spend-
ing relative to GDP, but not to the business cycle. Federal workers consistently have
higher probabilities of having employer-provided pension plans and health insurance.
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1 Introduction
There is long-standing interest in labor economics about the compensation of gov-
ernment workers relative to their private-sector counterparts. The modern, human capi-
tal/Mincerian wage equation approach to this topic was pioneered in a series of papers by
Smith (1976a,b,1977). There has been recent revival of interest in the issue, with Congres-
sional Budget Office (2012, 2017), Bradley (2012), and Biggs and Richwine (2011) examining
the federal-private compensation differential, Gittleman and Pierce (2012), Munnell (2011),
and Allegretto and Keefe (2010) studying state and local government pay, and Bewerunge
and Rosen (2012) investigating all levels of government compensation. We suspect this
increased attention is to the surge in federal deficits and the squeeze on state and local
government budgets in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Presumably, any overcom-
pensation of public employees presents potential for government cost savings.
Though the current wage and compensation difference of public and private employees
is of interest, this paper produces and examines a time series of the pay differential between
federal and private-sector employees. This enables us to determine not only the current
pay differential but also if it has changed over time. We study the time period from 1995
to 2017. For wages and salaries, we use the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS
MORG). There are well documented differences in federal and private fringe benefits as well
and we examine these using the March Current Population Survey (CPS). For this analysis,
we estimate the probabilities that private sector and federal sector workers receive health
insurance and pension benefits from their employers.
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We find that, over this time period, the federal-private wage differential is always positive
but varies from a low of 3.4 percent to a high of 17.7 percent. This differential fell through
the late 1990s, rose steadily in the 2000s until 2013, then tended to decrease. An analysis
of these differentials suggest some evidence that they grow as federal spending as a share of
GDP grows but, once this is accounted for, they are unrelated to the business cycle. Also,
federal workers have much higher probabilities of receiving employer-sponsored pension plans
and health insurance, though time patterns in these differentials are not as clear.
In our analysis of wages, we deal with unobserved heterogeneity by using control function
methods. Naturally, systematic unobserved differences in the abilities of federal and private
workers can bias estimates of the wage differentials. The control function approach we
adopt allows ability to be two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional. This is consistent
with a Roy model, where some workers’ unobserved traits make them more suited to one
sector and not another. One-dimensional ability is a special case that we test for and reject
for many of the years in our data. One-dimensional unobserved ability may be dealt with
by instrumental variable (IV) or fixed effects (FE) methods, but because this is frequently
rejected in the data, we do not use these methods. Moreover, though the selectivity bias we
find is statistically significant in many cases, its magnitude is very small and estimates are
nearly identical to those from OLS.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 briefly reviews the past
literature on public-private wage differentials and section 2.2 provides an overview of federal
rules on compensation. Section 3 describes the main dataset, the CPS MORG, and presents
summary statistics for the main variables. Section 4 presents the results from the OLS wage
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equations. The handling of the unobservables and the findings are discussed in Section
5. Section 6 examines how the probability of pension plan and health insurance coverage
differ between federal and private workers. In Section 7, we examine how the time path of
the federal-private wage differential depends on federal spending, the business cycle, and
presidential administration. Lastly, Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Past Literature1
Wage differentials between public and private sector employees have been well docu-
mented starting with Smith’s seminal series of papers (1976a, 1976b, 1977). Smith (1976a)
found that in 1960, federal workers were paid more than comparable private sector workers
and this wage advantage continued in 1970. This difference implied that the earlier reforms
made in the federal pay system did not bring federal pay in line with the private sector.
Smith (1977) also found that the government wage differential varied by level of government-
federal, state, or local - and by gender. Moulton (1990) revisited public-private wage dif-
ferentials by taking into account better occupational controls and differences in local labor
market conditions. He found that doing so reduced that magnitude, but did not eliminate,
the federal wage gap.
A number of papers consider the growing skill differential in the private sector, as well
as the responsiveness of government pay to market conditions, and how they may affect the
1A more extensive review is in Choi (2016).
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public-private wage gap. Katz and Krueger (1991) note that during the 1980s growth in the
private-sector skill differential, there was not much change in federal wages in this regard.
They indicate, though, that state and local government wages seemed more responsive to
local economic conditions. Freeman (1987) also considers the sensitivity of government
pay to economic conditions. He finds that that state and local government wages and
employment respond to their respective government budgets, but with no clear patterns
regarding federal workers. Borjas (2003) examines the skill differential and wage dispersion
from 1960 to 2000 in the public and private sectors. The greater growth of wages at higher
skill levels in the private sector is verified and he shows that this growth was not matched
in the public sector, resulting in relatively less wage dispersion. Borjas (2003) indicates that
this has made it more difficult to recruit high skilled workers into government.2
Public-private wage differentials also have generated recent research efforts. Bewerunge
and Rosen (2012) examine federal, state, and local compensation differentials for 2004 and
2006 with data from the Health and Retirement Survey. They find a substantial wage
premium for federal worker but very little differences for state and local workers. However,
workers at all levels of government attain more fringe benefit compensation relative to their
private-sector counterparts. Biggs and Richwine (2011) and Congressional Budget Office
(2012, 2017) investigate wage and fringe benefit differentials between federal and private
workers. Biggs and Richwine (2011) consider the 2006 to 2010 time period, while the first
Congressional Budget Office study examines 2005 to 2010 and the second considers 2011
to 2015. Each generally finds a positive federal wage premium, though it is much smaller
2See Borjas (1980) for his work on political influences on federal wages.
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(or even negative) at very high levels of education. Also, federal fringe benefits are higher
for federal workers, though this advantage is less for the highly educated workers. Bradley
(2012) summarizes some of this recent work as well as noting methodological issues.
An important issue in this literature is the role of unobserved productivity. For example,
suppose federal workers are better on unmeasured dimensions and earn higher compensation
as a result. This generates an ability bias, where the positive federal pay gap may, in part,
reflect higher ability rather than a true pay premium. Some authors have utilized fixed-
effect estimation to deal with this issue. Krueger (1988) does so with two data sets. One is
Current Population Survey (CPS) matched data from the mid- to late-1970s. The other is
CPS supplements on displaced workers from the mid-1980s. The former data show a small
and insignificant effect of federal employment with the fixed effects estimator, compared
to a large, positive and significant effect in the cross-sectional analysis. The latter show
little difference between estimation methods: a 10.7 percent federal wage premium with
fixed effects and a 12.6 percent gap with OLS. Biggs and Richwine (2011) find a 9 percent
federal wage gap from a sample of individuals from 2004 to 2008 in the Survey of Income
and Program Participation. This compares to their OLS estimate of a 14 percent pay gap
using CPS data.
Gyourko and Tracy (1988) deal with unobservables via control function methods. Using
data from the 1977 CPS, they estimate the union-nonunion wage differential for the private
and public sectors and the government wage differential for union and nonunion workers.
They find a substantial wage differential for federal workers, but quite small differentials for
state and local government employees. Interestingly, they find positive selection for private,
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nonunion workers and negative selection for public, union workers. This suggests that the
ability bias may go in direction of underestimating the government wage differential. Also,
their approach enables unobservables to affect wages in the different sectors in different
ways, i.e., that ability may be multidimensional where someone may good in one sector but
not in another. This is an issue that we examine in detail below.3
Other work has investigated public-private wage differentials in other countries. Several
recent studies in European Union (EU) countries find positive pay differentials in favor of
the public sector that are generally higher for women, for workers at the low end of the wage
distribution, and in selected sectors. They also find notable differences across EU countries:
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibited higher public sector premia than other
countries. See Bargain and Melly (2008), Giordano, et. al. (2011), and Castro, et. al.
(2013).
Other recent studies have focused solely on state and local government workers. These
include Munnell et. al. (2011), Allegretto and Keefe (2010), and Gittleman and Pierce
(2012). As with other related studies, they find no consistent wage differential between state
or local government workers and the private sector. However, both groups of government
workers are paid more in fringe benefits that similar private sector workers.
2.2 Federal Rules on Compensation
The private sector and federal government are potential competitors as employers in
the labor market. In light of this, the federal government has devised compensation rules
3Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) apply similar methods in their analysis of public and private wages
in the Ivory Coast.
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in order to pay comparably to the private sector with both its basic pay system and its
adoption of special rates.4 Here, we give an overview of those systems. According to U.S.
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the basic pay rules are also divided into two parts,
General Schedule (GS) and the Federal Wage System (FWS). The GS classification and
pay system covers the majority of the civilian white-collar federal employees in professional,
technical, administrative, and clerical positions. The GS has 15 grades from GS-1 (lowest)
to GS-15 (highest). Each grade is classified by job based on the responsibility, level of
difficulty, and qualifications required. Each grade has 10 within-grade steps that are each
worth approximately a 3 percent increase in the wage. The FWS was established for Federal
blue-collar workers comparable to prevailing private sector rates in each local wage area.
The FWS covers Federal trade, craft, and laboring employees. There are two basic principles
for FWS: 1) wages are set according to local prevailing rates, and 2) there will be equal pay
for equal work and pay distinctions in keeping with work distinctions. For each wage area,
OPM identifies a lead agency that is responsible for conducting wage surveys, analyzing
data, and issuing wage schedules under the two principals above. Employees are paid the
full prevailing rate at step 2 in each grade. The highest step in FWS, step 5, the wage of
employees is 12 percent above the prevailing rate of pay.
OPM establishes a higher rate of basic pay for a group or category of GS positions in one
or more geographic areas to address existing or likely significant handicaps in recruiting or
retaining well-qualified employees. The special rates address staffing problems caused by sig-
4A special rate is higher rate of basic pay for a group or category of General Schedule (GS) positions
in one or more geographic areas to address existing or likely significant handicaps in recruiting or retaining
well-qualified employees.
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nificantly higher non-federal pay rates than those payable by the federal government within
the area, location, or occupational group involved. This includes the remoteness of the area
or location involved, the undesirability of the working conditions or nature of the work in-
volved, or any other circumstances OPM considers appropriate. Most of GS employees are
entitled to locality pay, which is a geographic-based percentage rate that reflects pay levels
for non-federal workers in certain geographic areas as determined by surveys conducted by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). There are currently 34 locality pay areas, which
cover the lower 48 States and Washington D.C., plus Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. territo-
ries and possessions. For extraordinarily difficult living conditions and undesirable working
conditions, the federal government pays both a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) and a post
differential. A post differential means an addition to basic pay that is payable in selected
non-foreign areas. A post differential is a recruitment incentive based on conditions of the
environment in the non-foreign area that differ significantly from conditions in the U.S. as
a whole. However, post differentials plus the COLA cannot exceed 25 percent of basic pay.
These are reflected in our data on compensation and our examination of federal pay relative
to private pay.
In addition, there is an overall COLA that raises basic rates of pay for each pay grade.
The amount of this COLA is based on the Employment Cost Index. However, the President
may alter or eliminate this pay increase due to unfavorable economic conditions. In fact,
for 2011, 2012, and 2013, this COLA was set to zero. This does not mean, however, that
federal pay raises during this period were zero. Federal employees may still obtain raises
through moving up in steps or grades, as well as through changes in the area-based or other
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adjustments noted above.
3 Basic Data
Our primary data source is the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation
Group (CPS MORG) from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) between
1995 and 2017. In recent years, each monthly CPS has included about 140,000 individuals
living in approximately 70,000 households. Using the MORG data instead of the March
CPS yields much larger number of observations because the MORG data is monthly. Each
month’s observations for a given year naturally form the pool of observations we use for
that year. From the earnings and hours questions, we compute average hourly earnings and
express in inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars. The usual demographic variables are utilized, as
well as the sector of employment: private, federal government, or other government. We
limit our sample to those who worked at least 35 hours per week and are age 18 to 70.
Table 1 summarizes the mean wages of private workers and public sector workers from
1995 to 2017. Separate columns are presented for private sector workers, along with federal,
state, and local government workers, with the latter two categories shown for informational
purposes only. The focus of this paper is the federal-private differential. Figure 1 shows the
unadjusted federal-private ratio over time. The ratio of average federal to average private
sector wages is over 30 percent in each year and is over 40 percent in some years. This ratio
fell during the initial years of our sample time frame, then increased over time.
We also examine coverage of workers by employer-provided health insurance and a pen-
sion plan. We rely on the annual March supplement of the CPS for this analysis since data
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on these variables are only available then. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the percent of workers
covered by employer-based health insurance and pension benefits for the federal and private
sectors. In each year, federal worker coverage exceeds that of the private sector for both of
these fringe benefits. On average over this period, federal employees have an 12.3 percent
higher coverage rate for health insurance (87.1 percent compared to 74.8 percent) and 32.3
percent higher for pension plan coverage (76 percent relative to 43.7 percent).
Table 3 present the summary statistics of variables that are included in our multivariate
analysis. All wages in the data are expressed in 2012 dollars. In the entire sample period, 3.2
percent of individuals were working in the federal government. On average, these workers
had more schooling, were slightly older, more likely to be unionized, more likely to be black,
about equally likely to be female, and more heavily in managerial, professional, and admin-
istrative support occupations. Also shown are variables for urban-rural location, regions,
and the 34 locality areas that the federal government offers locality wage differentials. Each
of these are control variables in our empirical analysis.
Table 4 summarizes mean values of key variables from the CPS MORG data for both
sectors over time. The average schooling level has increased in the federal and private
sectors by about the same amount, as has average age. Percent female in the two sectors
changed little over this time period. We also show the trends in the four occupational
groups that comprise roughly 90 percent of federal workers - management, professional,
service, and administrative support. The extent of managerial workers varied somewhat
over time - falling then rising - among federal workers and rose slightly in the private sector.
The percent of professionals rose in both sectors, as did the use of service workers. For
10
administrative support personnel, the percent of the federal workforce in these occupations
fell over time while it changed little in the private sector.
4 Baseline OLS Estimation
This section presents OLS estimation of the federal-private wage differential as a baseline
for comparison to estimates that deal with unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate two
separate equations, year-by-year; one for federal workers only and one for all private sector
workers from 1995 to 2017. The equations that we use to estimate the OLS models are
below. Here, the dummy variable dit equals 1 if the worker is employed in the federal sector
and 0 otherwise:
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + βfitXit + 
f
it if dit = 1, where t = 1995, · · · , 2017 (1.1)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + βpitXit + 
p
it if dit = 0, where t = 1995, · · · , 2017 (1.2)
The variable Yit is average hourly earnings for workers. The term Xit is a vector of
individual characteristics and demographics including schooling, experience, gender, union
status, race, MSA, region, occupation, and locality, and it is the disturbance term. Their
summary statistics are as shown in Table 3 noted above. After obtaining estimated co-
efficients, the predicted federal-private wage differential is computed, evaluated at sample
means.
Table 5 and Figure 3 summarize the estimated wage gap between two sectors. Calculating
the wage differentials, year by year, using two separate equations from each sector, we find
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that federal government workers received between 3.4 percent and 17.7 percent more than
their counterparts in private sector. Each of these differentials is statistically significant,
except the lowest value which occurred in 1999. These findings suggest that the federal pay
differential is invariably positive and, as can be seen, it fell during the 1990s, began to rise
in the early 2000s, and generally continued to rise until 2013. Then it began to decrease to
the end of the sample period.
Additional OLS wage regressions are estimated by year and separately for federal and
private sector workers with only the four major occupation groups which dominate federal
employment: management occupations; professional occupations; service occupations; and
administrative support occupations. By focusing on this narrower set of white collar occu-
pations, the sample is more comparable to the federal work force thus we may remove a
good deal of unobserved heterogeneity from the estimates and provide a simple robustness
check on the previous findings. Table 6 and Figure 4 present the computed federal wage
differentials from this analysis. Overall time pattern of the differentials are quite similar
to the previous case. However, these federal wage premia are more stable and tend to be
slightly higher, varying between 8.2 and 16.9 percent. Note that the wage differentials es-
timated with this subsample or the entire sample above are in keeping with the magnitude
of estimates found in the literature.
5 Dealing with Unobservables
The OLS model assumes that the ‘public’ variable is uncorrelated with disturbance term,
implying that sectoral differences in unobserved characteristics do not affect the estimated
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wage differential. Here, we relax this assumption.
Let
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + βfitXit + φi + θ
f
i + 
f
it if dit = 1 (2)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + βpitXit + φi + θ
p
i + 
p
it if dit = 0 (3)
where φi indicates the worker’s absolute advantage in both the federal and private sectors,
reflecting ‘ability’ such that a worker with a higher φi can earn a higher wage in both
sectors. This is the usual person-specific fixed effect. We generalize this by including the
terms θf and θp, which are relative/comparative advantages indicating how well-matched
an individual is to each sector. These are as in a Roy model. For example, a person can
be well-suited to government work and not for the private sector, implying a large θf and a
low θp. Naturally, other cases are possible. If θf= θp then this collapses to the special case
of absolute advantage with only φi. Note that the formulation of (2) and (3) allows ‘abillty’
to be two-dimensional rather than uni-dimensional. The jit terms are white noise for each
sector. These equations can be re-written as
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + βfitXit + 1 if dit = 1 (4)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + βpitXit + 0 if dit = 0 (5)
where 1 = φi + θfi + 
f
it and 0 = φi + θ
p
i + 
p
it . A common way to deal a model like this
with two dimensional unobservables is use of the Heckman-Lee method. Other methods
such as instrumental variable (IV) and fixed effect (FE) models deal only with unidimen-
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sional ability. As shown below, using a control function approach, we can test whether
the unobservable ability is one-dimensional or two-dimensional. To do so, we start with
original Heckman-Lee assumption of joint normality. We later relax this assumption in our
robustness checks.
The probability of a workers choosing the federal sector depends on the wage differen-
tial s/he obtains and exogenous factors such as the ease finding federal relative to private
employment. Let the latter factor be represented by the vector Zi. Then the probability of
dit = 1 is :
Pr(di = 1) = Xiδ + Ziγ + αφi + τ(θfi − θpi ) + ui (6)
Equation (6) can be written as
di = Viψ + 2 (7)
di =

1 if 2 > −Viψ
0 if 2 ≤ −Viψ
where 2 = αφi + τ(θfi − θpi ) and Vi = f(Xi, Zi). Note that equation (6) estimates the
probability of being a federal government employee, thus we expect the term τ to be positive.
That is, the better the match to federal employment, (θfi −θpi ), the more likely the person is
a federal worker. The expectation of the disturbance terms for federal workers and private
sector workers from equations (4) and (5) are
E(1|di = 1) = E(1|2 > −Viψ) = σ12
σ2
[ f(Viψ)1− F (Viψ) ] (8)
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E(0|di = 0) = E(0|2 ≤ −Viψ) = σ02
σ2
[ −f(Viψ)1− F (Viψ) ] (9)
where σ12 is the covariance of 1 and 2 and σ02 is the covariance of 0 and 2, f is the
standard normal density function and F is the cumulative normal density function. It is
these two expression that are the control function, or selection, variables.
Note that
σ12 = Cov(1, 2)
= Cov(φi + θfi + 
f
i , αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui)
= ασ2φ + τ(σ2f − σfp)
(10)
and
σ02 = Cov(0, 2)
= Cov(φi + θpi + 
p
i , αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui)
= ασ2φ + τ(σfp − σ2p)
(11)
where σfp is covariance between θf and θp, σ2f and σ2p are the variances of θf and θp,
respectively.5
If there is only absolute advantage, φi 6≡ 0 and θfi ≡ θpi ≡ 0 , then from equation (10)
and (11) :
σ12 = ασ2φ (12)
σ02 = ασ2φ (13)
5The formulations in (10) and (11) assumes that φ is uncorrelated with the two match parameters, θf
and θp. Dropping this assumption changes little in our discussion.
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In this case, we have a standard one-diminsional, fixed-effect that can be dealt with via
IV or FE estimation. In the Heckman-Lee framework, the coefficients on the selectivity
variables are identical. If higher ability employees are more likely to be federal government
worker (α > 0)„ then σ02= σ12 > 0. On the contrary, if higher ability employees are more
likely to be private sector worker(α < 0), then σ02= σ12 < 0.
With both absolute advantage and comparative advantages, φi 6≡ 0 and θfi 6≡ 0 6≡ θpi ,
then depending on the size of each variance and covariance, σ12 and σ02 can be either sign.
Positive values of σ2f , σ2p, and τ tend to make σ12>0 and σ02<0, though the other terms in
(10) and (11) can generate different outcomes. The nature of the cross-equation correlation
is readily tested with the Heckman-Lee methodology; it is a test of the equality of the
coefficients on the two selectivity terms.6
To estimate the wage equations, we follow the standard Heckman-Lee procedure. We
first estimate (7) with probit. For the vector of Zi variables, we use variables intended
to capture the ease of finding private sector jobs relative to federal jobs in each worker’s
location. To control for business cycle factors that may affect this relative availability, we
include the worker’s state unemployment rate, the state real GDP growth rate, and the
state employment growth rate. We also include the ratio of federal government workers to
all employees in the state.
The wage equations we estimate can be written as:
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + βfitXit +
σ12
σ2
[ f(Viψ)1− F (Viψ) ] + ν1 if dit = 1 (14)
6See Garen (1987) for a closely related discussion
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ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + βpitXit +
σ02
σ2
[ −f(Viψ)1− F (Viψ) ] + ν0 if dit = 0 (15)
where estimated values of the selectivity terms from the probit are substituted in above
and ν1 and ν0 are the applicable disturbance terms. Here, we can see that this formulation
enables a simple test of whether the Roy model is appropriate relative to a unidimensional
ability model by testing the equality of the coefficients on the two selectivity term. If they
are equal, then IV or FE estimation also may be applied. If they are not equal, then the
latter two methods are not appropriate.
Table 7 and Table 8 show the coefficients on the two selectivity coefficients for each
year, with the former table for entire sample and the latter for the subsample of four
occupations. In Table 7, the coefficients for the private sector are consistently positive
and significant. However, the coefficients for the federal sector workers are unstable and
tend to be insignificant. The final column of Table 7 shows the t-statistics for the tests of
equality of the coefficients. For nearly half of the years, we reject the hypothesis of equal
coefficients. With a sample of only four occupations in Table 8, the pattern is similar to
that in Table 7. In most cases, the coefficient for the private sector is positive and larger
than that for the federal sector. For much of the sample period, the message is that the
selectivity coefficients differ.
As is well known, the Heckman-Lee procedure rests on strong functional form assump-
tions. Thus, we proceeded with a more general control function approach and estimated a
variety of models with many functional forms to determine the robustness of our results.7
7These procedures are in line with the guidance of Imbens and Wooldridge (2007).
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In particular, we estimated equation (7) that determines the worker’s sector by linear prob-
ability and logit, as well as by probit. From each of these, we formed an estimate of E(2i
| di). These were entered linearly, as quadratics, and as cubics in each wage equation. The
findings are consistent with the above. There tends to be a positive and significant associa-
tion of private sector wages and E(2i | di = 0). The association of federal sector wages and
E(2i | di = 1) is unstable and generally not statistically significant. Tests of equality of the
two effects on wages are mostly rejected. Moreover, when we calculate the federal-private
wage differential using estimates with the various control functions, we find nearly identical
results. Note that we frequently reject the one-dimensional model of ability. Because IV
and FE estimation methods assume one-dimensional ability, it is not generally appropriate
to use these methods and we pursue these alternatives no further. Additionally, as described
below, we find that unobserved heterogeneity has little effect on the magnitude of the wage
differentials.
The federal-private wage differential is calculated with the Heckman-Lee estimation and
the results shown in Table 9 and Table 10. The former table is for the entire sample and
the latter for the subsample of four occupation groups. The findings are nearly identical to
those of OLS. Figure 5 plots the coefficients from Table 9 against the coefficients for the
corresponding OLS wage equation of Table 5. Visually, they nearly overlay one another.
The wage gap from Heckman-Lee model is at most 1.3 percent larger and is, at minimum,
0.8 percent smaller than that from OLS.
Regarding the four occupation subsample, Figure 6 plots the coefficients of Table 10
against the corresponding OLS coefficients from Table 6. Again, the plots are nearly iden-
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tical. Therefore, though selectivity bias generally is statistically significant, especially for
private sector wages, its economic magnitude is so small as to make little difference in the
wage differential computation.
Moreover, this indicates that our conclusions from the OLS analysis above continue to
hold: the federal wage differential has been positive throughout this period; it fell in the
late 1990s and rose fairly steadily though the 2000s until 2013 and then decreased to the
end of the sample period; the subsample of four occupations suggests a larger differential in
the 1990s with a smaller decline, but quite close to the differential from the entire sample
for the later part of the period; the federal-private wage differential during this period was
not lower than 3.4 percent and as high as 17.7 percent.
6 Fringe Benefit Analysis
Fringe benefits are often a large share of compensation so it is important to compare
fringe benefit provision between the federal and private sectors. From the March CPS, the
variables available are whether or not the worker has an employer-provided health insurance
plan and an employer-sponsored retirement plan. Thus, we estimate the effect of federal
sector employment on the provision of each of these, holding constant a host of covariates.
In particular, we estimate the probability of receipt of each of these fringe benefits by probit
as:
P (Yit = 1) = Φ(X ′itρ+ ditλ) (16)
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where i indexes the individual, and t indexes time. In this estimation, Yit is a dummy
variable indicating whether the worker has a health insurance plan or a retirement pension
plan from his/her current employer, Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for the
standard normal. The vector of observable characteristics Xit and dit are the same as in the
OLS wage equation model. We run separate probit equations by year for health insurance
and pension plan provision.
Table 11 shows the marginal effects of federal sector employment on the probability of
obtaining each fringe benefit. Federal government workers enjoy a much higher probability
of receiving an employer-provided retirement pension. This higher probability ranges from
13.4 to 29.6 percent, depending on the year. It decreased until the early 2000s, but then
rose albeit is a somewhat irregular way. Figure 7 shows the plot of these differentials over
time. The second column in Table 11 shows the findings is for employer-provided health
insurance. The results for health insurance are less dramatic than for pensions. Federal
workers generally have a higher probability of receiving health insurance, though by how
much varies from year to year. It is as small as -4 percent and as large as nearly 11 percent.
These effects are plotted in Figure 8 and show the somewhat irregular pattern just noted.
This analysis reinforces earlier findings in the literature that federal workers are compensated
with greater fringe benefits.
7 Analyzing the Time Path of Wage Differentials
In this section, we examine the relationship between the yearly estimated federal-private
wage differential and national-level economic and political variables. To capture effect of the
20
business cycle, we use the unemployment rate of 25 to 54 year olds. We also use the federal
spending to GDP ratio. This variable may reflect both economic and political influences.
Federal spending tends to rise as the business cycle worsens, so it may partially capture
business cycle effects. Higher federal spending may also reflect a political environment
more favorable to larger government and, naturally, more federal spending may enable
higher federal pay. We also use a dummy variable for each presidential administration;
Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump. These are utilized as explanatory variables to explain
the time variation in the federal-private wage differential. The findings are presented in
Table 12. For the first two columns, we use only the unemployment rate variable and the
ratio of federal spending to GDP as covariates. Regarding the dependent variable, we use
the wage differential from the sample of all workers in the first column and that from the
subsample of four occupations in the second sample.8 These are as reported in Tables 9
and 10, respectively. For the first column, we find a positive and significant effect of federal
spending on the federal wage differential. For all workers, an additional 1 percent of federal
spending to GDP is associated with a 1.7 percent higher federal wage differential.
The unemployment rate variable has a negative though insignificant effect in the first
column and positive and insignificant in the second column. One might expect a positive
effect since a higher unemployment indicates a slack private labor market and some of the
previous literature suggested a widening gap between federal and private wages. However,
part of this effect may be captured in the federal spending variable since federal spending
typically rises with the unemployment rate.
8Because the wage differentials are estimated, we correct for any potential problem with standard errors
by using Huber/White robust standard errors.
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In the third and fourth columns of Table 12, we include dummy variables for each
presidential administration, with the Clinton administration the omitted category. In the
third column, the Bush and Obama administration dummies are both positive, with the
former larger than the latter. The Trump administration dummy is negative. Only the
Bush administration dummy is significant, though. Regarding the fourth column, the Bush
and Obama administration coefficients are both quite small and insignificant, with the
former positive and the latter negative. The Trump administration coefficient is negative
and significant. Note, though, that these coefficients are reflective of the time pattern
of the estimated wage differentials: for the entire sample, the differential fell, then rose
throughout the Bush and Obama years and fell again during the Trump years, while for
the subsample, the rise was mostly during the Bush years. Additionally, these are effects
holding constant federal spending and the unemployment rate which changed substantial
across presidential administrations. Regarding those effects, we find a positive effect of the
ratio of federal spending to GDP in both columns, though it reaches significance only in
the third column. The coefficients on the unemployment rate variable are negative and
statistically insignificant.
8 Conclusion
Our empirical analysis of the federal wage differential from 1995 to 2017 reaches several
robust conclusions. The differential has been positive throughout this period. It fell in the
late 1990s and rose fairly steadily though the 2000s until 2013, and then tended to decrease to
the end of the sample period. Our preferred estimate indicate it varied between 3.4 percent
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and 17.7 percent. A similar pattern emerges when examining only the four occupations that
comprise most of the federal workforce. Results after correction for unobserved heterogeneity
with use of control function methods are nearly identical to those from OLS. Additionally,
the probabilities of federal workers having a pension plan and employer-sponsored health
insurance are persistently higher than for private-sector workers.
Finally, we examine factors that affect the wage differential over time. Among economic
indices, the federal spending to GDP ratio tends to be positively related to the wage gap.
Once this is accounted for, the effect of the business cycle, as measured by the unemployment
rate, has little effect. Holding constant the above two factors, the federal pay differential was
higher under Bush and Obama administrations and lower under the Trump administration
relative to the Clinton administration. These effects do not consistently attain statistical
significance, though.
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Table 1: Real Average Hourly Earnings, by Worker Category, 1995-2017 CPS MORG. 
Source: Current Population Surveys 
 
Figure 1: Trend of Real Wage Ratio between Federal and Private Sector. 
 
 
Federal State Local Privte Federal/Private State/Private Local/ Private
1995 25.842 21.659 22.420 19.609 1.318 1.105 1.143
1996 25.886 21.516 21.964 19.315 1.340 1.114 1.137
1997 25.943 21.778 22.162 19.609 1.323 1.111 1.130
1998 26.635 22.451 22.598 20.476 1.301 1.096 1.104
1999 27.646 22.749 22.956 20.943 1.320 1.086 1.096
2000 27.430 22.722 22.882 20.991 1.307 1.082 1.090
2001 28.212 23.076 22.974 21.582 1.307 1.069 1.064
2002 28.757 23.749 23.300 21.890 1.314 1.085 1.064
2003 28.617 23.600 23.199 21.914 1.306 1.077 1.059
2004 29.615 23.688 23.604 21.932 1.350 1.080 1.076
2005 29.971 23.402 23.100 21.780 1.376 1.074 1.061
2006 30.262 23.349 23.128 21.689 1.395 1.077 1.066
2007 30.594 23.703 23.468 21.833 1.401 1.086 1.075
2008 29.812 23.762 23.518 21.985 1.356 1.081 1.070
2009 30.813 24.074 23.924 22.546 1.367 1.068 1.061
2010 30.594 24.286 24.065 22.339 1.370 1.087 1.077
2011 30.505 23.778 23.873 22.128 1.379 1.075 1.079
2012 31.477 23.579 23.480 22.281 1.413 1.058 1.054
2013 31.772 23.644 23.507 22.198 1.431 1.065 1.059
2014 30.757 23.692 23.487 22.204 1.385 1.067 1.058
2015 31.050 24.206 24.249 22.594 1.374 1.071 1.073
2016 31.229 24.228 24.231 23.078 1.353 1.050 1.050
2017 31.171 24.247 23.965 22.966 1.357 1.056 1.044
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Table 2: Percentage of workers receiving fringe benefit 
 
 
 
 
 
Private Federal Private Federal
1995 0.743 0.890 0.448 0.802
1996 0.763 0.906 0.447 0.830
1997 0.759 0.865 0.449 0.799
1998 0.762 0.881 0.454 0.759
1999 0.768 0.835 0.481 0.786
2000 0.791 0.876 0.480 0.743
2001 0.806 0.910 0.481 0.755
2002 0.810 0.923 0.480 0.760
2003 0.796 0.885 0.461 0.777
2004 0.784 0.895 0.458 0.744
2005 0.768 0.893 0.454 0.771
2006 0.750 0.866 0.449 0.741
2007 0.736 0.896 0.426 0.763
2008 0.746 0.874 0.460 0.778
2009 0.741 0.895 0.444 0.774
2010 0.707 0.881 0.427 0.763
2011 0.710 0.887 0.421 0.795
2012 0.712 0.862 0.432 0.744
2013 0.703 0.893 0.424 0.785
2014 0.706 0.805 0.423 0.762
2015 0.715 0.792 0.390 0.751
2016 0.712 0.842 0.334 0.658
2017 0.706 0.772 0.327 0.643
Source: Current Population Surveys
Health Insurance Pension Plan
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Figure 2 : Percentage of workers receiving Fringe Benefits (Fed. Vs. Private) 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, 1995-2017 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Group. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wage 21.933 13.384 29.459 15.059 21.669 13.243
Health Insurance 0.757 0.429 0.873 0.333 0.753 0.431
Pension Plan 0.452 0.498 0.759 0.428 0.441 0.497
Federal Employee 0.032 0.177
School 13.474 2.587 14.908 2.496 13.426 2.577
Age 40.492 12.179 44.360 11.234 40.362 12.188
Female 0.437 0.496 0.457 0.498 0.436 0.496
Union 0.089 0.285 0.180 0.384 0.086 0.281
Msa
  Metropolitan 0.284 0.451 0.336 0.472 0.289 0.453
  Balance 0.478 0.500 0.455 0.498 0.479 0.500
  Non-Metropolitan 0.231 0.422 0.209 0.407 0.232 0.422
Experience 21.018 12.321 23.452 11.507 20.936 12.339
Region
  Northeast 0.203 0.402 0.120 0.325 0.207 0.405
  Midwest 0.242 0.428 0.150 0.357 0.245 0.430
  South 0.316 0.465 0.455 0.498 0.311 0.463
  West 0.238 0.426 0.275 0.446 0.237 0.425
Race
  White 0.730 0.444 0.673 0.469 0.727 0.445
  Black 0.091 0.288 0.160 0.366 0.089 0.285
  Asian 0.046 0.208 0.051 0.220 0.045 0.208
  Others 0.137 0.344 0.117 0.321 0.138 0.345
Occupation
  Management 0.158 0.365 0.253 0.435 0.162 0.368
  Professional 0.215 0.411 0.328 0.469 0.171 0.377
  Service 0.132 0.339 0.118 0.323 0.123 0.328
  Sales 0.097 0.296 0.016 0.124 0.116 0.320
  Administrative support 0.139 0.346 0.164 0.371 0.138 0.345
  Farming, fishing, and forestry 0.011 0.102 0.008 0.087 0.012 0.108
  Construction 0.055 0.229 0.021 0.142 0.061 0.240
  Installation, maintenance, and repair 0.042 0.200 0.036 0.187 0.046 0.209
  Production 0.083 0.275 0.026 0.160 0.097 0.296
  Transportation 0.067 0.250 0.030 0.170 0.075 0.263
Locality
  Atlanta 0.012 0.108 0.008 0.091 0.012 0.109
  Boston 0.016 0.125 0.008 0.088 0.016 0.126
  Buffalo-Niagara 0.003 0.052 0.002 0.040 0.003 0.053
  Chicago 0.027 0.161 0.012 0.108 0.027 0.162
  Cincinnati 0.006 0.077 0.004 0.059 0.006 0.077
  Cleveland 0.009 0.093 0.005 0.069 0.009 0.094
  Columbus 0.005 0.069 0.003 0.057 0.005 0.070
Entire Sample Federal Private
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Table 3 (cont’d) 
 
Note: Definitions of Variables: Hourly Wage: The wage rate is used, if reported. Otherwise, this is reported 
earning divided by reported usual hours over that time span. Public: This variable is created from the ‘Class of 
Job’ survey question. State and local government workers are dropped from sample. As a result, federal 
government workers have value for this variable equal to 1 and 0 for private sector workers. School: This variable 
indicates the number of years of education the workers attained. Experience: Potential experience (= Age- School 
-6). Female: If a worker who interviewed is female, then the value for this variable is 1 and 0. Union: equal 1 for 
union members, 0 otherwise. Race: There are four race dummy variables one each for White, Black, Asian, others. 
Region: There are four region dummy variables, one each Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. MSA: This 
variable defines the ‘Metropolitan Statistical Area’ status. Separate dummies are created in the city of an MSA, 
the balance of the MSA, and non-metropolitan location. Occupation: Dummies variables are created for ten major 
occupations. Locality: This variable indicates 33 separate metropolitan locality pay areas and one variable 
for “Rest of U.S.”. Federal government offers 34 different wage schedules which are depending on the location 
and cost of living.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Locality (cont’d)
  Dallas 0.014 0.116 0.008 0.087 0.014 0.117
  Dayton 0.003 0.051 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.051
  Denver 0.012 0.107 0.011 0.105 0.012 0.107
  Detroit 0.015 0.121 0.006 0.080 0.015 0.122
  Hartford 0.005 0.072 0.001 0.037 0.005 0.073
  Houston 0.012 0.108 0.004 0.064 0.012 0.109
  Huntsville 0.002 0.043 0.005 0.070 0.002 0.042
  Indianapolis 0.005 0.069 0.004 0.060 0.005 0.070
  Los Angeles 0.033 0.180 0.017 0.128 0.034 0.181
  Miami 0.012 0.108 0.006 0.079 0.012 0.109
  Milwaukee 0.006 0.079 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.080
  Minneapolis 0.013 0.114 0.005 0.071 0.014 0.115
  New York 0.045 0.208 0.022 0.145 0.046 0.210
  Philadelphia 0.021 0.145 0.016 0.124 0.022 0.145
  Phoenix 0.010 0.097 0.005 0.069 0.010 0.098
  Pittsburgh 0.007 0.084 0.003 0.058 0.007 0.084
  Portland 0.008 0.088 0.004 0.065 0.008 0.089
  Raleigh 0.004 0.067 0.003 0.051 0.005 0.067
  Richmond 0.003 0.056 0.004 0.061 0.003 0.055
  Sacramento 0.004 0.061 0.003 0.051 0.004 0.061
  San Diego 0.006 0.077 0.010 0.098 0.006 0.076
  San Jose 0.014 0.119 0.009 0.094 0.014 0.120
  Seattle 0.010 0.098 0.008 0.088 0.010 0.098
  Washington 0.039 0.194 0.213 0.409 0.033 0.180
  State of Alaska 0.011 0.103 0.031 0.174 0.010 0.099
  State of Hawaii 0.012 0.110 0.029 0.167 0.012 0.107
  Rest of U.S. 0.606 0.489 0.527 0.499 0.600 0.490
Source: Current Population Surveys
Entire Sample Federal Private
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Table 4 : Detailed Summary of Key Variables in Federal Government and Private Sector Workers, Year-by-Year, 1995-2017 CPS MORG 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private Federal Private
1995 14.3520 13.1231 42.4799 38.1402 0.4721 0.4291 0.1915 0.1153 0.7019 0.7849 0.2809 0.1464 0.2937 0.1449 0.0840 0.1014 0.2059 0.1472
1996 14.3688 13.1070 43.0279 38.3341 0.4679 0.4309 0.1890 0.1114 0.7076 0.7789 0.2771 0.1477 0.2940 0.1448 0.0838 0.1034 0.1976 0.1453
1997 14.4591 13.1132 42.8133 38.4340 0.4667 0.4328 0.1779 0.1070 0.7200 0.7689 0.2695 0.1506 0.2990 0.1488 0.0938 0.1022 0.1985 0.1416
1998 14.4598 13.1454 43.3043 38.6617 0.4695 0.4326 0.1893 0.1054 0.7098 0.7631 0.2780 0.1526 0.2947 0.1520 0.0938 0.1037 0.1957 0.1420
1999 14.5862 13.1630 43.9659 38.8884 0.4572 0.4308 0.1873 0.1049 0.7039 0.7564 0.2945 0.1557 0.2993 0.1546 0.0916 0.1044 0.1803 0.1378
2000 14.5201 13.1698 43.9679 38.9645 0.4402 0.4314 0.1761 0.0998 0.7013 0.7412 0.2705 0.1560 0.3102 0.1552 0.0857 0.1035 0.1906 0.1394
2001 14.6314 13.2293 44.1584 39.3028 0.4558 0.4328 0.1921 0.0983 0.7020 0.7436 0.2753 0.1603 0.3173 0.1601 0.0901 0.1057 0.1699 0.1366
2002 14.6452 13.2728 44.3165 39.6607 0.4746 0.4348 0.1849 0.0945 0.6835 0.7515 0.2768 0.1638 0.3129 0.1622 0.1056 0.1073 0.1745 0.1339
2003 14.6188 13.2896 44.3450 39.9761 0.4790 0.4379 0.1840 0.0895 0.6788 0.7451 0.2368 0.1505 0.3164 0.1624 0.1211 0.1251 0.1822 0.1509
2004 14.6744 13.3073 44.6819 40.1246 0.4604 0.4355 0.1735 0.0866 0.6773 0.7375 0.2322 0.1509 0.3248 0.1635 0.1345 0.1289 0.1615 0.1467
2005 14.7823 13.3197 44.7881 40.2127 0.4494 0.4349 0.1699 0.0845 0.6800 0.7313 0.2319 0.1510 0.3158 0.1647 0.1330 0.1277 0.1725 0.1460
2006 14.8534 13.3316 45.0279 40.3514 0.4515 0.4338 0.1719 0.0804 0.6737 0.7183 0.2285 0.1528 0.3276 0.1644 0.1268 0.1302 0.1797 0.1446
2007 14.9815 13.3927 44.7131 40.5955 0.4449 0.4372 0.1559 0.0803 0.6592 0.7136 0.2399 0.1573 0.3355 0.1676 0.1239 0.1289 0.1622 0.1424
2008 14.9397 13.4673 44.7791 40.8612 0.4634 0.4377 0.1768 0.0826 0.6614 0.7164 0.2352 0.1611 0.3384 0.1737 0.1180 0.1308 0.1619 0.1409
2009 14.9973 13.5470 44.8439 41.3024 0.4676 0.4424 0.1793 0.0774 0.6686 0.7188 0.2473 0.1678 0.3208 0.1823 0.1334 0.1364 0.1556 0.1390
2010 15.0283 13.5974 44.2943 41.4373 0.4512 0.4442 0.1750 0.0758 0.6533 0.7142 0.2282 0.1656 0.3322 0.1870 0.1419 0.1381 0.1601 0.1397
2011 15.1276 13.6381 44.6907 41.6339 0.4502 0.4418 0.1800 0.0750 0.6678 0.7113 0.2422 0.1684 0.3447 0.1873 0.1281 0.1362 0.1495 0.1375
2012 15.2929 13.6938 44.6459 41.7773 0.4527 0.4363 0.1675 0.0713 0.6668 0.7067 0.2505 0.1755 0.3602 0.1876 0.1267 0.1359 0.1416 0.1319
2013 15.3905 13.7482 44.9923 41.8899 0.4501 0.4383 0.1796 0.0724 0.6449 0.7033 0.2557 0.1760 0.3489 0.1909 0.1347 0.1338 0.1404 0.1311
2014 15.4022 13.7482 44.8234 41.9066 0.4590 0.4369 0.1858 0.0717 0.6324 0.6954 0.2497 0.1746 0.3526 0.1918 0.1320 0.1334 0.1401 0.1298
2015 15.4354 13.7598 44.9279 41.8763 0.4666 0.4380 0.1846 0.0702 0.6402 0.6839 0.2363 0.1757 0.3595 0.1952 0.1376 0.1332 0.1391 0.1277
2016 15.4070 13.7987 44.7671 41.8243 0.4353 0.4375 0.1799 0.0675 0.6453 0.6764 0.2622 0.1783 0.3547 0.1965 0.1338 0.1358 0.1241 0.1252
2017 15.4471 13.8502 45.0219 41.9834 0.4379 0.4393 0.1826 0.0685 0.6310 0.6753 0.2495 0.1800 0.3604 0.2007 0.1376 0.1331 0.1300 0.1203
Source: Current Population Surveys
Management Professional Sevice AdministationSchool Age Female Union White
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Table 5: Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 1995-2017 CPS MORG 
 
 
OLS Wage Differential
1995 0.123***
(0.016)
1996 0.123***
(0.018)
1997 0.096***
(0.019)
1998 0.052**
(0.022)
1999 0.034
(0.028)
2000 0.080***
(0.015)
2001 0.083***
(0.014)
2002 0.079***
(0.015)
2003 0.119***
(0.018)
2004 0.094***
(0.016)
2005 0.132***
(0.015)
2006 0.154***
(0.017)
2007 0.157***
(0.015)
2008 0.152***
(0.014)
2009 0.160***
(0.014)
2010 0.163***
(0.015)
2011 0.144***
(0.017)
2012 0.155***
(0.020)
2013 0.177***
(0.018)
2014 0.132**
(0.053)
2015 0.114***
(0.016)
2016 0.135***
(0.016)
2017 0.122***
(0.018)
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Current Population Surveys
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Table 6: Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 4 Occupations, 1995-2017 CPS MORG 
 
 
OLS Wage Differential (4 Occ.)
1995 0.139***
(0.013)
1996 0.133***
(0.012)
1997 0.132***
(0.013)
1998 0.100***
(0.015)
1999 0.099***
(0.014)
2000 0.086***
(0.015)
2001 0.114***
(0.013)
2002 0.118***
(0.012)
2003 0.082***
(0.014)
2004 0.108***
(0.014)
2005 0.123***
(0.014)
2006 0.147***
(0.014)
2007 0.160***
(0.015)
2008 0.154***
(0.013)
2009 0.148***
(0.014)
2010 0.156***
(0.014)
2011 0.136***
(0.014)
2012 0.151***
(0.019)
2013 0.169***
(0.016)
2014 0.147***
(0.039)
2015 0.116***
(0.015)
2016 0.118***
(0.015)
2017 0.104***
(0.017)
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Current Population Surveys
36 
 
Figure 3 : Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 1995-2017 CPS MORG 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 4 Occupations, 1995-2017 CPS MORG 
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Table 7: Differences in Coefficients of inverse Mills ratio, Year-by-Year, Each Sector 
 
 
Federal IMR Coefficient Private IMR Coefficient Difference
1995 0.147 0.262*** -0.114
(0.096) (0.044) (0.124)
1996 0.180 0.296*** -0.116
(0.133) (0.041) (0.123)
1997 0.256** 0.418*** -0.162
(0.119) (0.041) (0.139)
1998 -0.148 0.376*** -0.524**
(0.201) (0.046) (0.211)
1999 -0.083 0.205*** -0.288
(0.210) (0.043) (0.188)
2000 -0.399*** 0.402*** -0.801***
(0.132) (0.044) (0.171)
2001 0.116 0.510*** -0.394***
(0.085) (0.042) (0.131)
2002 0.025 0.253*** -0.228***
(0.084) (0.039) (0.086)
2003 0.108 0.300*** -0.192
(0.104) (0.047) (0.122)
2004 0.297*** 0.352*** -0.056
(0.108) (0.043) (0.121)
2005 0.123 0.286*** -0.163
(0.150) (0.043) (0.144)
2006 0.005 0.225*** -0.221*
(0.125) (0.043) (0.127)
2007 0.093 0.235*** -0.142
(0.100) (0.046) (0.111)
2008 -0.066 0.196*** -0.262***
(0.083) (0.045) (0.072)
2009 -0.115 0.182*** -0.297***
(0.106) (0.047) (0.107)
2010 -0.006 0.373*** -0.379**
(0.130) (0.049) (0.145)
2011 0.232** 0.199*** 0.032
(0.097) (0.045) (0.121)
2012 0.009 0.176*** -0.167
(0.134) (0.046) (0.159)
2013 -0.017 0.133*** -0.150
(0.104) (0.044) (0.112)
2014 -0.237 0.075 -0.162
(0.222) (0.084) (0.181)
2015 0.153 0.208*** -0.055
(0.118) (0.046) (0.122)
2016 -0.062 0.249*** -0.311**
(0.114) (0.047) (0.116)
2017 -0.089 0.156*** -0.245**
(0.132) (0.048) (0.101)
Source: Current Population Surveys
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Differences in Coefficients of inverse Mills ratio, Year-by-Year, Each Sector, 4 
Occupations 
 
 
Federal IMR Coefficient Private IMR Coefficient Difference
1995 0.117 0.153** -0.036
(0.119) (0.044) (0.117)
1996 0.314* 0.268*** 0.046
(0.161) (0.060) (0.148)
1997 0.353** 0.331*** 0.022
(0.158) (0.063) (0.214)
1998 0.036 0.087 -0.050
(0.215) (0.073) (0.252)
1999 -0.287 0.080 -0.367
(0.288) (0.063) (0.509)
2000 -0.387*** 0.253*** -0.640***
(0.136) (0.063) (0.220)
2001 0.157 0.434*** -0.277**
(0.106) (0.055) (0.140)
2002 0.093 0.177*** -0.084
(0.099) (0.056) (0.088)
2003 0.087 0.389*** -0.301**
(0.114) (0.065) (0.118)
2004 0.290** 0.360*** -0.070
(0.119) (0.061) (0.151)
2005 0.220 0.206*** 0.014
(0.158) (0.062) (0.196)
2006 0.013 0.151** -0.138
(0.126) (0.061) (0.110)
2007 0.097 0.138** -0.041
(0.099) (0.063) (0.114)
2008 -0.091 0.212*** -0.302***
(0.095) (0.058) (0.098)
2009 -0.126 0.161** -0.288***
(0.128) (0.065) (0.105)
2010 0.059 0.405*** -0.347**
(0.156) (0.069) (0.147)
2011 0.231** 0.149** 0.082
(0.106) (0.061) (0.101)
2012 -0.049 0.176*** -0.225*
(0.149) (0.064) (0.134)
2013 -0.021 0.181*** -.203*
(0.108) (0.058) (0.112)
2014 -0.388 -0.020 -0.368*
(0.237) (0.107) (0.192)
2015 0.100 0.226*** -0.127
(0.117) (0.062) (0.169)
2016 -0.042 0.197*** -0.239**
(0.126) (0.064) (0.120)
2017 -0.088 0.091 -0.180
(0.145) (0.064) (0.116)
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Current Population Surveys
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Table 9: Wage Differential using Heckman Selection Model, Year-by-Year, CPS ORG 
 
 
Wage Differential (Heckman)
1995 0.131***
(0.021)
1996 0.129***
(0.018)
1997 0.101***
(0.020)
1998 0.048**
(0.025)
1999 0.034
(0.029)
2000 0.079***
(0.019)
2001 0.082***
(0.015)
2002 0.079***
(0.015)
2003 0.118***
(0.019)
2004 0.099***
(0.016)
2005 0.133***
(0.015)
2006 0.154***
(0.015)
2007 0.158***
(0.017)
2008 0.148***
(0.015)
2009 0.152***
(0.017)
2010 0.161***
(0.017)
2011 0.158***
(0.018)
2012 0.155***
(0.021)
2013 0.177***
(0.019)
2014 0.124**
(0.050)
2015 0.112***
(0.016)
2016 0.138***
(0.019)
2017 0.125***
(0.018)
Source: Current Population Surveys
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Wage Differential using Heckman Selection Model, Year-by-Year, 4 Occupation, CPS 
ORG 
 
Wage Differential(Heckman, 4 Occupation)
1995 0.146***
(0.018)
1996 0.143***
(0.017)
1997 0.144***
(0.018)
1998 0.101***
(0.023)
1999 0.097***
(0.018)
2000 0.084***
(0.017)
2001 0.112***
(0.012)
2002 0.118***
(0.012)
2003 0.080***
(0.014)
2004 0.105***
(0.014)
2005 0.122***
(0.016)
2006 0.147***
(0.013)
2007 0.160***
(0.014)
2008 0.154***
(0.012)
2009 0.146***
(0.015)
2010 0.156***
(0.014)
2011 0.140***
(0.015)
2012 0.150***
(0.020)
2013 0.170***
(0.019)
2014 0.153***
(0.043)
2015 0.112***
(0.017)
2016 0.123***
(0.016)
2017 0.110***
(0.017)
Source: Current Population Surveys
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5: Comparing Wage differentials (OLS vs. Heckman) 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparing Wage differentials (OLS vs. Heckman, 4 Occupation) 
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Table 11: Fringe Benefit Differential from Probit model 
 
Pension Plan Health Insurance
1995 0.252
***
  0.095
***
(0.032) (0.023)
1996 0.291
***
   0.087
***
(0.034) (0.024)
1997 0.263
*** 0.029
(0.036) (0.029)
1998 0.260
*** 0.058**
(0.036) (0.028)
1999 0.214
*** 0.002
(0.037) (0.031)
2000 0.134
*** -0.003
(0.036) (0.028)
2001 0.182
***
    0.064
***
(0.026) (0.016)
2002 0.193
***
   0.055
***
(0.026) (0.017)
2003 0.244
*** 0.019
(0.025) (0.019)
2004 0.208
***
  0.047
**
(0.026) (0.019)
2005 0.250
***
0.064
***
(0.032) (0.024)
2006 0.189
*** 0.034
(0.032) (0.026)
2007 0.233
***
    0.094
***
(0.032) (0.024)
2008 0.204
*** 0.041
(0.033) (0.028)
2009 0.259
***
 0.057
**
(0.032) (0.027)
2010 0.262
***
    0.102
***
(0.030) (0.024)
2011 0.296
***
    0.109
***
(0.031) (0.025)
2012 0.238
***
0.062
**
(0.033) (0.028)
2013 0.255
***
   0.099
***
(0.032) (0.026)
2014 0.246
*** -0.020
(0.030) (0.029)
2015 0.268
*** -0.043
(0.032) (0.030)
2016 0.224
***
   0.050
*
(0.031) (0.027)
2017 0.222
*** -0.036
(0.032) (0.030)
Note: standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Current Population Surveys
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Figure 7: Trend of Pension Plan Differentials, Year-by-Year, March CPS 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Trend of Health Insurance Differentials, Year-by-Year, March CPS 
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Table 12 : Time series analysis of Wage Differentials  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 4 Occ. All 4 Occ.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Unemployment Rate (Age 25~54) -0.003 0.001 -0.011 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Fed. Spending to GDP      0.017
*** 0.007   0.025
** 0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Bush    0.034
** 0.005
(0.014) (0.013)
Obama 0.011 -0.004
(0.024) (0.021)
Trump -0.014  -0.036
*
(0.025) (0.020)
Constant  -0.196
** -0.009  -0.337
* -0.109
(0.076) (0.083) (0.171) (0.138)
Note: Huber/White robust standard errors in parentheses , *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specification 1 Specification 2
